

## Section 7. Foreign & Imperial Policy 1919-39

In terms of Foreign Policy, we might divide the era by decades. Before the Great Depression, we might see Britain dealing primarily with the consolidation and making of peace. After, it faced the rise of Japan, Italy and Nazi Germany, and what Richard Overly calls the *Road to War*. We can also look at foreign and imperial policy from other angles aside from what we might call the German Question.

- How far was Britain able to maintain its world power status after the Great War?
- How far was Britain able to maintain the integrity and strength of its empire between the wars? To what extent did imperial policy change?
- How far did Britain become isolationist between the wars?
- How effectively did Britain deal with the threats if Japan, Italy and Germany in the 1930s?

For all that, there remains the central question: Germany. Why did Britain follow a policy of appeasement? Was there a viable alternative to it (and if so, what, and when)? Was appeasement a moral wrong? You will also need to bear in mind the way in which appeasement has been viewed since: what students of international relations often call the appeasement analogy.

### INTRODUCTION (1): AN OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN THE WARS

Use **Flagship** (pp 160-62)

Outline the issues Britain faced in foreign and imperial policy between the wars

- The problems in the 1920s
- The problems of the 1930s
- Appeasement and the failure of collective security

Was Britain's apparent security after the Great War an illusion? Or was it real, and did Britain squander it? How far were the Foreign Office right to fear that another world war would finish the empire, or finish Britain as a great power?

There is a list of terms, pp 161-62: learn them, you will need to use them

Be aware on the modern historiography of the war (see the Stephen Cooper article in History Today, below); the Just War and a Forgotten Victory, and the Learning Curve.

### INTRODUCTION (2): WHAT LIMITS WERE THERE ON BRITAIN'S ABILITY TO PURSUE AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY?

Use **Flagship** (pp 160-62)

**What were Britain's primary aims and how did they change between the wars?**

In addition to those listed in the book, we might add these:

- Britain was what is known as a satiated power, meaning had had all it wanted in terms of empire, territory and great power status. Thus its primary stance in these years was defensive.

- If we accept that idea, and recognise the fear that another war would weaken or destroy Britain's pre-eminence, then the avoidance of war became a priority.
- Since the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and especially since Napoleon, Britain's primary foreign policy objective was the balance of power. It went to war in 1914 for that reason.
- Within that, since the time of Elizabeth I, Britain wanted to avoid a great power, or a potentially hostile one, controlling the North Sea coast: once again, it went to war in 1914 for that reason.
- The foreign office also believed that before the Great War, Britain had de facto committed itself to the defence of France, and this gave it no freedom of manoeuvre in the crisis of 1914. Thus, it sought to avoid such commitments where possible, and feared the principle of collective security
- It also came to view the Treaty of Versailles as excessively harsh and saw some validity in German calls for its terms to be revised or ameliorated. In doing so, it also sought to tie Germany into a web of diplomatic agreements in the 1920s; in the 1930s, this metamorphosed into appeasement.

#### **What limits were there on Britain's foreign policy?**

- The burden of war debts and government finances between the wars
- Bonar Law's view
- The need for social expenditure
- Inter-war economic problems
- Keeping and managing the empire
- The de facto independence of the white dominions
- The impact of defence policy, defence cuts and the Ten Year Rule

#### **Who was making foreign policy?**

Look at the list of foreign secretaries (p 164), and add Arthur Henderson (June 1929 - Sept 1931). Also, be aware the foreign policy can also be made elsewhere, especially from Number Ten. In 1919, it was Lloyd George rather than Curzon, leading at Versailles. Ramsay MacDonald (who was his own foreign secretary in the first Labour government) took a very keen interest in foreign policy. When Neville Chamberlain became prime minister in 1937, arguably the direction of foreign policy came from Number Ten.

How far was Britain trying to conduct the foreign policy of a great power on shaky foundations?

#### **PART ONE: THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT**

Our basic text is **Flagship** (pp 165-68)

Margaret MacMillan's magnificent book *The Peacemakers* tells us that in the first half of 1919, the Paris Peace Conference was, in effect, a kind of world government. The Big Three were, therefore, negotiating nothing short of a new world order.

You do not need to know the ins and outs of these complex and labyrinthine negotiations, nor all the terms of the treaties. However, you do need to know what the five treaties were, and how they redrew the map of Europe in particular. Most of all, you do need to know the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.

- What were Britain's interests at Versailles?
- How successful was Lloyd George in pursuing them?

The post-war treaties, and the Treaty of Versailles in particular, remain deeply controversial. For the British diplomat and historian, Harold Nicholson, it was a Carthaginian Peace. For Keynes, it was economic madness. By the 1930s, the Foreign Office viewed it as far too harsh and as a mistake. Subsequent historians have taken a more measured view, but still differ.

### **The League of Nations**

- Why was it created by the treaty of Versailles?
- Why did Britain support it?
- What problems did the League have? Is it fair to say that Britain were ambivalent about it from the start?

### **The Chanak Crisis**

We have already covered the Chanak crisis when we looked at the fall of Lloyd George. We might now want to note that it had significance in foreign policy too.

- Had Curzon reasserted the primacy of the foreign office?
- Did it reveal the Conservative party (and especially the backbenches) to be more pacific than hitherto?
- It showed the increasing self-assertion of the Dominion prime ministers and parliaments, which might act as a serious constraint upon British foreign policy after
- It led to the redrawing of one of the five post-war treaties, in favour of Turkey (a defeated power in 1918)

## **PART TWO: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1920s**

### **Use Flagship (pp 168-173)**

At the centre of British foreign policy in the 1920s was what we might call the fallout from the post-war treaties, most of all what we might call the German Question, which in turn centred on Franco-German relations (and Britain's increasingly fraught relationship with France). In the first years, to 1924, Franco-German relations were (predictably awful)

### **For the period 1919-23**

- Arguments over reparations
- The Ruhr Crisis and German hyperinflation in 1923.
- Why was Britain so concerned about Germany's problems, and the German economy?

How far did the problems that followed Versailles lead Britain to shift policy towards seeing itself as an honest broker trying to improve Franco-German relations, help Germany recover and revise the terms of the Treaty of Versailles?

### **For the period 1924-29**

After the crisis of 1923, the years that followed are seen as a period of improving relations, beginning under Ramsay MacDonald, but most of all associated with Austen Chamberlain.

- The Dawes Plan
- The Geneva Protocol
- Locarno Treaties: the spirit of Locarno, the Locarno Honeymoon
- German entry to the League of Nations
- The Geneva tea parties
- IABC
- Stresemann & Poland
- Kellogg-Briand Pact
- Young Plan
- The failure of disarmament

Answer Qs 1 and 3, p173

#### Anglo-Soviet Relations

- Why were Anglo-Soviet relations so bad?
- Why did Lloyd George & Ramsay MacDonald seek to improve them?
- Why, in the end, did they fail?

How far were the seeds of Appeasement sown in the 1920s?

### PART THREE: IMPERIAL POLICY 1919-39

#### Use Flagship (pp174-82)

With the Mandates, the British Empire reached its territorial zenith. However, underneath, it might be thought that the foundations of empire were far shakier after the Great War than they were before. Thus, the best way to protect the empire, was to maintain peace.

#### What problems did Britain face?

- The White Dominions
- India
- Ireland
- The Middle East
- Africa

#### The Dominions

- In essence, one product of the Great War was the de facto independence of the dominions, as recognised in the 1931 Statute of Westminster. How did that independence come about?
- How successful was Britain in stimulating trade with the empire by imperial preference?

#### India

- Outline the nature of Indian nationalism and Britain's reactions to it. Make sure you understand:
  - The Raj, the Secretary of State for India, the viceroy (especially Lord Irwin)
  - Morley-Minto Reforms and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms

- Dominion status, independence; how policy tended to combine or vary between conciliation and/or coercion
- Indian nationalism: Gandhi and Congress (Nehru, Bose), and the differences between them
- Muslim League (& Jinnah)
- Amritsar massacre
- Simon Commission
- 1935 Government of India Act

Why India was so controversial in Conservative Party?

### The Middle East

After the First World War, Britain had become the leading power in the Middle East

- Why was Palestine so problematic? Make sure you understand:
  - Arab nationalism and Zionism
  - The McMahon Letter, Lawrence of Arabia, the Sykes-Picot Agreement & the Balfour Declaration
  - The issue of Jewish immigration
  - The Arab Revolt
  - The Peel Commission & the MacDonald Report
- Iraq & Egypt

Had Britain bitten off more than it could chew?

### Africa

Policy in Africa was beset by the problems of placating white settlers and black Africans, and half-hearted reform measures.

How secure were the foundations of the British Empire between the wars? Was Britain over-stretched? Were the worst fears of the foreign office well-grounded, that another Great War would finish the empire off?

## PART THREE: THE ROAD TO WAR, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1930s

Our basic text is **Flagship** (pp 182-89; 217-216)

The Ghosts of Churchill and Neville Chamberlain hang heavy here. After the Second World War, what we might call the Churchill line became the unshakeable orthodoxy. In 1940, a three young journalists (including the future Labour leader Michael Foot) published *The Guilty Men*, blaming Chamberlain et al for leading Britain to the disaster of Dunkirk. In the first volume of his best-selling account of the war, *The Gathering Storm*, Churchill was no less sweeping in his condemnation. The history of foreign policy in the 1930s was very much seen through Churchill's lens. There were dissenters then (such as Rab Butler, a junior foreign office minister at the time of Munich) and modern historians have come to view appeasement differently (see below).

One of their themes would be to point out a simple fact: the governments of the 1930s were juggling several different plates at a time, in very difficult circumstances. An understanding of appeasement must take account of those issues, and remember the global context in which British policy was formulated, which have just been studying. In the 1930s, however, a series of crises arose which, arguably, deflected governments attention away from Germany just when it needed to be there. The first problem arose from a domestic political crisis in Japan, which put power into the hands of an aggressively expansionist military.

### **Japanese Expansionism & the Manchuria Crisis**

Outline the nature of the crisis and the international response. Why was the League of Nations so ineffectual?

What interests did Britain have in China and the Far East? Why was the British response so limited?

In 1937, Japan attacked the rest of China.

### **The Origins of Appeasement: the policy options**

While Japan mattered, it was peripheral. Much more pressing was Europe and, in particular, Germany under Hitler (from January 30<sup>th</sup> 1933). To understand British policy towards Hitler, you first need to understand the parameters of British policy, in 1934, once British defence policy once more saw Germany as a potential enemy. There were, in essence, two approaches:

- To seek collective security against Germany
- To seek to acknowledge German grievances over Versailles and hope to mollify them and, at the same time, tie Germany into a web of international agreements that made war impossible.

In practice, both policies could be followed simultaneously. They might also be accompanied by more than a little measure of wait and see.

### **Italy**

The other key issue was Italy, and Italy mattered. Both approaches needed Italy. This can be illustrated with two examples:

- In 1934, Hitler stirred up a political crisis in Austria, in effect agitating for Anschluss (the union of Germany and Austria). Mussolini moved Italian troops up to the border. Hitler backed down. Collective security lay behind the Locarno Treaties, Italy could help enforce that.
- In 1938, Mussolini played a prominent role in the Munich Conference, the high point of appeasement

Thus, the Abyssinia Crisis was crucial to policy in the 1930s

Before Abyssinia, Britain's relations with Mussolini were generally good

- Locarno
- Widespread admiration for Mussolini (find some examples)
- The Stresa Front

In talks, an ailing MacDonald gave Mussolini the impression that Britain was relaxed about an Italian adventure in Abyssinia. The result was the Abyssinia Crisis. Make sure you understand the following:

- The Hoare –Laval Pact and why it collapsed
- The impact of the crisis on public opinion
- The way in which the Abyssinia crisis drove Mussolini into Hitler's arms
- Even after Abyssinia, and after the alliance between Hitler, hopes were still placed in the idea of Mussolini acting as a honest broker or restraint upon Germany. This would be evident in the faith Neville Chamberlain put in his sister-in-laws private contacts with Mussolini. It also led to Eden's resignation in 1937, and to Mussolini's role at Munich

## Appeasement

Appeasement was adopted towards Hitler right from the start, before the Czech crisis

- German withdrawal from The League of nations & the World Disarmament Conference
- German rearmament
- The Anglo-German Naval Agreement: see the [blog article](https://rgshistory.wordpress.com/2015/06/18/britain-france-the-germans-continental-wars-and-the-perils-of-diplomacy-the-18th-june-anniversary-and-the-anglo-german-naval-agreement/)  
<https://rgshistory.wordpress.com/2015/06/18/britain-france-the-germans-continental-wars-and-the-perils-of-diplomacy-the-18th-june-anniversary-and-the-anglo-german-naval-agreement/>
- The remilitarisation of the Rhineland
- *Anschluss*

## Why appeasement?

There was, it is argued, a compelling logic to appeasement in the 1930s, and in 1938 in particular:

- To avoid war if at all possible was, of itself, a laudable and honourable policy. No-one surely wanted another Great War
- Britain's defences were being rebuilt, appeasement brought time
- 'The bomber will always get through'
- Public opinion was believed to be strongly against war
  - *All Quiet in the Western Front* and other works
  - The East Fulham by-election
  - The Peace Pledge Union
  - The Oxford Union debate
  - The Appalling Frankness speech
- Germany's demands seemed reasonable
  - The Treaty of Versailles had been too harsh
  - Why shouldn't all Germans live in one Germany?
  - In the earlier 1930s, Germany was still weak
  - Hitler might actually be reasonable after all
  - By tying him into a web of agreements, Hitler might be constrained diplomatically
- There was no viable alternative, especially in 1938

- Anglo-French relations were poor, French governments unstable and France was wedded to the Maginot mentality
  - Mussolini and Hitler were allies. Mussolini might be able to restrain Hitler, but the Stresa Front was dead
  - The small states of central Europe were too weak and divided to stand up to Hitler
  - The Soviet Union was communist, and at least as bad as Nazi Germany, and in 1938 in the middle of the Great Terror
- British prestige, and Chamberlain's, made the idea of Britain acting as an honest broker in the summer of 1938 at least worth a go.

### **The Sudeten Crisis and the Munich Agreement**

A diplomatic success?

### **The Road to War**

Within weeks, the optimism of Munich had gone and war scares proliferated. Then, in March 1939, Hitler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia.

### **FURTHER READING, LISTENING & VIEWING**

Sixth form history needs you to do reading of your own. Already, this guide had given you references to the Flagship textbook, and some other resources. You need to take steps beyond that both online and, of course, by resorting to another revolutionary technology, the book. For modern British history, there is a dizzying array of printed and online resources, of startlingly variable quality. If you do find something not on here that's good, let the rest of us know through the Facebook page or email [s.tilbrook@rgs.newcastle.sch.uk](mailto:s.tilbrook@rgs.newcastle.sch.uk) and we'll add it.

For each topic or area, we have colour coded each book or article:

- Blue is essential
- Yellow means if you want to develop a deeper understanding you should read one or all of these
- Green means this is a monograph, or a sophisticated or highly detailed account. Learn how to dip into real history books, a vital study skill; you might sometimes find full books actually become more engrossing
- Pink is for choices that are more loosely related, and have grabbed someone's interest at some point. Try one or two, they might be fun

### **A WORD ABOUT ONLINE RESOURCES**

Three of the best resources are, of course, the History department's very own Blog, Facebook page and Twitter feed.

### ***The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (DNB)***

Beyond that, for the British history course, get used to using one of the best resources available, and for free; the DNB. Any local library card will get you in: anyone can join the City Library via this link <https://eforms.newcastle.gov.uk/popup.aspx/RenderForm/?F.Name=JVpTDqdaf2o>



Once you have a library card number, got to <http://www.oxforddnb.com/> and fill in your number. You then have access to it all. They vary in quality from the good to absolutely excellent, and they are all written by leaders in the field. The best have a particularly good last section, dealing with how history has viewed these men and women, and their historiography. There are also some very good **Themes**, such as the one above on the Union of Democratic Control.

### **History Today**

Beyond that, another invaluable resource is **History Today**. We have institutional access to the entire archive, here: <http://www.historytoday.com/user/login>

Username: Tilbrook

Password: historian

You can search at your leisure, and find all sorts. These guides will flag some up for you.

### **Philip Allan Resources**

Another good resources is Philip Allan Magazines Online, aimed very much at sixth-form students: here <http://my.dynamic-learning.co.uk/default.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2farchive.aspx>

Username: j.richardson@rgs.newcastle.sch.uk

Password: rgs1

The archive is then searchable

### **FURTHER READING: textbooks and student introductions**

There is a range of series aimed at sixth form history students. None make for exciting reading, and they vary in quality, but you should always aim to read at least one. The politics of the coalition are pretty well covered in the following:

Stephen Lee, *British Political History 1914-1995* (Lon 1996), chs 9 & 10

Malcolm Pearce & Geoffrey Stewart, *British Political History 1867-200* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed, Lon 2002) pp 299-324

### **Here are some other overviews:**

Peter Clarke, *Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-1990* (Lon 1996)

TO Lloyd, *Empire, Welfare State, Europe: English History 1906-92* (4<sup>th</sup> ed, Oxford 1993)

Roy Hattersley, *Borrowed Time: Britain Between the Wars* (Lon 2007), chs 1 & 16

Two classic works:

CL Mowatt, *Britain Between the Wars* (Lon 1955)

AJP Taylor, *English History 1914-45* (Oxford 1965)

### **FURTHER READING**

Another approach is to read about specific areas, or people.

The DNB entries on Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain are essential, but others are also worth a look.

There is a blog post on Neville Chamberlain here:

<https://rgshistory.wordpress.com/2018/01/16/tory-leaders-we-have-known-neville-chamberlain/>

The one on him as chancellor is also essential:

<https://rgshistory.wordpress.com/2018/01/22/the-chancellors-8-neville-chamberlain/>

The blog articles on Foreign Secretaries are found here

<https://rgshistory.wordpress.com/british-outlines/>

Harry Bennett, *Healing a Continent: Britain and European Reconstruction After the First World War*

**Philip Allan** 20th Century History Review | Modern History Vol 6 | 2 November 1994  
<http://magazinesonline.philipallan.co.uk/default.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2farchive.aspx>

GH Bennett, *British Foreign Policy 1900-1939*; in Chris Wrigley (ed), *A Companion to 20<sup>th</sup> Century Britain* (Oxford 2003), ch 3

Ben Vessey, *Anglo-German Relations, 1918-39*

**Philip Allan** 20th Century History Review | Modern History Vol 15 | 2 November 2003

Paul W Doer, *British Foreign Policy 1919-39* (Manchester 1998)

David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British policy & World Power in the 20th Century* (Lon 1991)

Richard Brayson, *Britain in Europe: Austen Chamberlain & the Locarno System, 1924-29*

**Philip Allan** 20th Century History Review | Modern History Vol 10 | 3 February 1999  
<http://my.dynamic-learning.co.uk/default.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2farchive.aspx>

J Garston, *The British Army in Germany 1918-1929* (1961)

**History Today**

<http://www.historytoday.com/j-garston/armies-occupation-part-ii-british-germany-1918-1929>

Peter Clements, *The Making of Enemies: Deteriorating Relationships between Britain & Germany, 1933-1939* (2000)

**History Today**

<http://www.historytoday.com/peter-clements/making-enemies-deteriorating-relationships-between-britain-and-germany-1933-1939>

Graham Goodlad, *Appeasement*

**Philip Allan** 20th Century History Review | Modern History Vol 12 | 4 April 2001

Ruth Henig, *Appeasement & the Origins of the Second World War*

Sarah Newman, *Why Appeasement?*

**Philip Allan** 20th Century History Review | Modern History Vol 10 | 3 February 1999

The nature of appeasement and, in particular, the Anglo-German Naval agreement is covered by this blog article: <https://rgshistory.wordpress.com/2015/06/18/britain-france-the-germans-continental-wars-and-the-perils-of-diplomacy-the-18th-june-anniversary-and-the-anglo-german-naval-agreement/>

James P Levy, *Appeasement & Rearmament: Britain 1936-39* (Oxford 2006)

Peter Neville, *The Dirty A-word: Appeasement* (2006)

On appeasement, the appeasement analogy, and its misuse

**History Today** <http://www.historytoday.com/peter-neville/dirty-word-appeasement>

Andrew Boxer, *French Appeasement* (2007)

France's disastrous foreign policy between the wars, and Britain's role.

**History Today** <http://www.historytoday.com/andrew-boxer/french-appeasement>

Timothy Benson, *Low and the Dictators* (2001)

Hitler's irritated reaction to being lampooned by David Low of the Evening Standard

**History Today** <http://www.historytoday.com/timothy-benson/low-and-dictators>

Peter Mellini, *Colonel Blimp's England* (1984)

David Low, the cartoonist, met Horatio Blimp, a retired Colonel, in a Turkish bath near Charing Cross in the early 1930s. Many agree with C.S. Lewis that Colonel Blimp was 'the most characteristic expression of the English temper in the period between the two wars', and was a satire on the complacency of the English ruling class in the face of fascism.

**History Today** <http://www.historytoday.com/peter-mellini/colonel-blimps-england>

There is also of blog article on David Low

<https://rgshistory.wordpress.com/2015/01/15/the-joy-of-satire-david-low/>

And on Hitler's fellow travellers:

<https://rgshistory.wordpress.com/2014/11/21/hitler-his-british-fellow-travellers-knoydart/>

Peter Beck, *England v Germany 1938: Football as Propaganda* (1982)

In the inter-war years, football was a popular sport which drew huge crowds of spectators. The totalitarian regimes of Germany and Italy were not slow to realise the propaganda potential of their nations' sporting successes – and soon Britain recognised the value of sport to its own national image

**History Today**

<http://www.historytoday.com/peter-beck/england-v-germany-1938-football-propaganda>

There is also a blog entry on Charlie Chaplin, and Hitler:

<https://rgshistory.wordpress.com/2014/12/15/charlie-chaplin/>

And on Laurel & Hardy, and Mussolini:

<https://rgshistory.wordpress.com/2014/12/15/laurel-and-hardy/>

There is a brilliant David Reynolds documentary on Munich:

<http://online.clickview.co.uk/exchange/series/6016647/summits?sort=atoz>

Chamberlain's return home from Munich must be watched:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SetNFqcyA>

There is also a Channel 4 film, *Did We Have to Fight?*

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jc5S6l7ecb0>

There is also a wonderfully biased newsreel bio from the time of Munich, *The Man of the Hour*:

<https://youtu.be/rqy28O975EY>

There is an old BBC series from 1989, *The Road to War*. This episode is about Britain:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y36mr5K-DbE>

Frank McDonough, *Chamberlain: Guilty Man or National Saviour?* (1995)

**History Today**

<http://www.historytoday.com/frank-mcdonough/chamberlain-guilty-man-or-national-saviour>

Robert Self, *Neville Chamberlain & Rearmament*

Philip Allan 20th Century History Review | 20th Century Vol 3 | 1 September 2007

<http://magazinesonline.philipallan.co.uk/default.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2farchive.aspx>

Nick Smart, *Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement* (2010)

Chamberlain's foreign policy and the historiography of appeasement.

**History Today**

<http://www.historytoday.com/nick-smart/neville-chamberlain-and-appeasement>

Nick Smart, *Neville Chamberlain* (2010)

A review of Robert Self, *Neville Chamberlain: a Biography*

**History Today** <http://www.historytoday.com/reviews/neville-chamberlain>

Richard Wilkinson, *A Review: Neville Chamberlain* (2010)

A review of Nick Smart, *Neville Chamberlain*

**History Today**

<http://www.historytoday.com/blog/books-blog/richard-wilkinson/book-review-neville-chamberlain>

Frank McDonough, *Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement & the Road to War* (1998)

David Dutton, *Neville Chamberlain* (Lon 2001)

The Churchillian version is of course given with aplomb in his own memoir:

Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Lon 1948)

Geoffrey Best, *Churchill and War* (Lon 2005), pp 100-112

Roy Jenkins, *Churchill* (Lon 2001)

John Charmley, *Churchill: the End of Glory* (Lon 1993)

There is also an entertaining if lopsidedly Churchillian HBO film, *The Gathering Storm*, in two parts:

<https://youtu.be/iC1TjAQ9GCo?list=PLA-75hf3Mbc7fYcKs-NUJuHO5wqJti-7T>

[https://youtu.be/U711X0Com\\_U](https://youtu.be/U711X0Com_U)

David Dutton, *Sir John Simon* (2002)

Was Simon the 'Worst Foreign Secretary since Ethelred the Unready'?

**History Today** <http://www.historytoday.com/david-dutton/sir-john-simon>

Philip Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin* (Lon 1999), chs 8 & 10

David Dutton, *Austen Chamberlain as Foreign Secretary* (2001)

Austen Chamberlain's impact on British foreign policy, & European affairs, between the wars

**History Today**

<http://www.historytoday.com/david-dutton/austen-chamberlain-foreign-secretary>

Martin Kitchen, *The Empire 1900-1939*; in Chris Wrigley (ed), *A Companion to 20<sup>th</sup> Century Britain* (Oxford 2003), ch 12

Sean Lang, *Indian Nationalism Before Gandhi*

**Philip Allan** 20th Century History Review | 20th Century Vol 6 | November 2010

*The Other India: The Rise of the Muslim League*

**Philip Allan** 20th Century History Review | 20th Century Vol 6 | 3 February 2011

*Did Gandhi Really Liberate India?*

**Philip Allan** 20th Century History Review | 20th Century Vol 2 | 1 September 2006

<http://my.dynamic-learning.co.uk/default.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2farchive.aspx>

David Meredith, *Imperial Images: The Empire Marketing Board, 1926-32* (1987)

Buying and selling with our 'kith and kin' was the hallmark of an intensive inter-war campaign for the idea of Empire

**History Today**

<http://www.historytoday.com/david-meredith/imperial-images-empire-marketing-board-1926-32>